

Emerging Threats



Terrorist Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
– An Open-Source Briefing of the Paris Attacks
on November 13, 2015

Mumbai Style Attacks

“If you’ve seen one terrorist attack...
you’ve seen ONE terrorist attack”

Each terror attack is unique, but trends are observable.

Mumbai style attacks or near simultaneous coordinated attacks involving multiple attackers and multiple targets represent a pronounced trend.

The Paris attacks of November 13, 2015 offers an illustration of the tactics, techniques, and procedures that may be encountered in Mumbai style attack trends.



Mumbai Style Attacks

Mumbai, India, 2008

Beginning the night of Nov. 26, 2008, 10 men associated with the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba terrorist group conducted multiple attacks in Mumbai, India. The terrorists traveled from Pakistan to India together, and then divided into four tactical units.

The first team of two terrorists initiated an attack at approximately 9:21 p.m. at the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus railway station. By firing into the crowds present at the station, the terrorists were able to kill 58 people over the course of 90 minutes. After exiting the station, they killed six police officers in an ambush attack. They killed 10 more people before law enforcement was able to kill one of the terrorists and capture the other.

The second site attacked was Nariman House, operated by the Jewish Chabad Lubavitch movement. The attack began on November 26 at 9:30 p.m. when the gas station next to the house exploded. Two terrorists fired on the building and then entered to take hostages. It took three days and several tactical engagements to rescue the hostages and kill the terrorists.

The Leopold Café was the site of the third attack, which began on November 26 at approximately 9:30 p.m. Four of the terrorists entered the cafe and opened fire, killing 10 people.

The cell then traveled to the Taj Mahal Palace and Tower Hotel to continue the attack. The siege, which killed 31 people, would continue for three days.

The fourth attack was at the Oberoi-Trident Hotel. Two of the terrorists entered the hotel restaurant on November 26 at 9:57 p.m. and opened fire on the crowd. The siege continued within the hotel until afternoon the following day. Approximately 30 people were killed.

SOURCE: Mumbai terror attacks fast facts. (Nov. 24, 2016.) CNN. Retrieved May 3, 2017, from www.cnn.com/2013/09/18/world/asia/mumbai-terror-attacks/ via [EMS Preparation and Response to Complex Coordinated Attacks - JEMS: EMS, Emergency Medical Services - Training, Paramedic, EMT News](#)



Mumbai Style Attacks / CCTAs / CCAs

Mumbai Style Attacks are also categorized as Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks (CCTAs) or Complex Coordinated Attacks (CCAs).

These attacks feature a violent assault or series of assaults by one or more individuals or groups using one or more type of weapons with the intent to inflict harm on large numbers of people.

While these type of attacks often result from various motives including terrorist ideology, the continued proliferation of CCTAs overseas and domestically demonstrates that CCTAs remain a concern for the future.



Why is this an Emerging Threat?

The occurrence of CCTAs have increased in recent years around the world, including several notable incidents: *f*

- In April 2019, three churches, three luxury hotels, a housing complex, and a guest house in and around Colombo, Sri Lanka were targeted in a coordinated suicide bombing attack. These attacks killed 259 people and at least 500 were wounded. *f*
- In August 2017, attackers in Barcelona, Spain drove vehicles into pedestrians and stabbed bystanders while attempting to escape, killing 16 people and injuring more than 130 others. *f*
- In March 2016, suicide bombers detonated three devices in Brussels, Belgium, two at Zaventem International Airport and one at the Maelbeek Metro Station. The blasts killed 32 people and injured more than 330. *f*



What CCTA Risk Factors Apply to Texas?

Terrorism and mass casualty attacks continue to pose a threat to Texas

- the November 2017 Sutherland Springs church shooting that killed 26 people and wounded 20 others;
- the May 2018 Santa Fe school shooting that killed ten and injured 14;
- the racially motivated violent extremist attack in El Paso in August 2019, which killed 23 people and injured more than 20;
- the August 2019 Midland-Odessa shooting that killed seven and injured 25;
- the May 2020 attack at Naval Air Station Corpus Christi.

Domestic terrorism activities in Texas, as in the rest of the United States, have become more prominent in recent years, posing a varied and persistent threat.

While Texas confronts a variety of domestic terrorist threats, Texas-based homegrown violent extremists continue to aspire to conduct attacks in Texas, and individuals sympathetic to foreign terrorist organizations continue to provide them material support in the form of recruitment, financial resources, and propaganda.

SOURCE: [Texas Homeland Security Strategic Plan 2021-2025](#)



Paris Attacks: November 13, 2015




Images Sourced from - [Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks Paris 2015 - Google Search](#)



November 13, 2015-Paris Attacks

On Friday November 13, 2015 a series of near simultaneous, coordinated attacks were carried out by three teams on seven locations in Paris and nearby areas. Attack venues included a stadium, a concert hall, and bars and restaurants. French authorities have placed the number of dead at 130. Another 352 people were injured, with a substantial portion classified as critically wounded.



SOURCE: (U//FOUO) Awareness (Update 6) Multiple Attacks - Paris, France (NOC 1033-15)



Paris Attacks - Concept of Operation

Ideological /Strategic Selection Factors:

- Western targets have remained the most desired for Islamist terror groups.
- Europe remains susceptible to terrorist attacks due to permissive social and legal conditions; accessible immigration policies; and substantial and growing feeder populations of disaffected North African/Middle Eastern communities.
- Open travel is accessible within most European borders through Schengen treaty countries.

Targeting: Time, Team deployment, Geography, and Target Type

- On a Friday evening in Paris, three teams of 9 individuals attacked a series of public venue targets throughout Paris including a high-profile soccer match being played by France and Germany.

(Note: French Pres. Hollande and German Foreign Minister Steinmeier attended the match)

Mode of Attack:

- The seven coordinated terror attacks throughout the capital were spread over an area of approximately four miles.
- The attacks began just after 2116 hours local time and were determined to be concluded at 0058 hours, however most action was confined to a 30 minute period between 2115 to 2145 hours.
- Employed multiple teams to simultaneously strike at “soft” targets in a rapid, coordinated fashion.




Paris Attack Participants

13 direct participants affected almost simultaneous coordinated attacks in Paris on 13 November. The attackers used a combination of small arms fire and suicide belts directed at soft targets and incorporating a functional level of tactical training and pre-planned coordination.

General characteristics of Attackers:

- Most were European nationals
- Most members had operational experience in Syria/Iraq
- Illicit travelers
- Most had criminal records
- Most connected to predominantly North African immigrant communities in Belgium and France



Source: Pictures AFP, EVN, EPA, Belgian Police

BBC

Chahib Akroah and Hasna Ait Boulachen- Killed with Abaaoud at 18 November raid in St. Denis, Paris.



Attack Location and Chronology

1 - Stade de France, St Denis, north of Paris - 3 attackers killed in suicide bombings and 1 bystander dead

- First team - initial bombings at 2116hrs and 2120hrs with a third bombing at 2153hrs

2- Le Carillon bar and Le Petit Cambodge restaurant, rue Alibert, 10th district -15 dead in small arms attacks

-2125hrs, a second team of gunmen drove up in a car, opening fire at diners of the Petit Cambodge Cambodian restaurant and Le Carillon bar on the other side of the road

3- Casa Nostra pizzeria, Rue de la Fontaine au Roi - 5 dead in small arms attacks

-second team drove approximately 500 yards to the Casa Nostra pizzeria and, less than ten minutes after its initial assault, opened fire at diners on the terrace

4- La Belle Equipe, 92 rue de Charonne, 11th district -19 dead in small arms attacks

-second team then drove approximately a mile to the southeast, apparently passing the Bataclan concert venue, and launched another attack at 2135hrs on the LaBelle Equipe bar on Rue de Charonne

5- Bataclan concert venue, 50 Boulevard Voltaire, 11th district -89 dead when stormed by gunmen

-A third team of individuals stormed the nearby Bataclan concert hall at about 2140hrs, meanwhile, an unnamed attacker exploded his belt at a restaurant up the road from the Bataclan at 2145hrs, seriously injuring a bystander.

-Gunmen at the concert hall reportedly fired indiscriminately into the crowd with AK-47 assault rifles. When counterterrorism police stormed the hall at 0020hrs, two of the gunmen detonated their suicide vests. The siege was declared over at 0058hrs.

SOURCE: Inter Port Police. Morrone Centre for Public Safety and Security. "Intelligence briefing: Assessing the threat of small arms attacks on multiple targets; The rise of "new" Islamist terrorism".



Attack Financing

- Financing of the operation was affected without any known direct association to foreign terror resources.
- It appears a piecemeal approach to financing all elements of the operation may have been employed to obscure tracking.
 - Le Parisien reported that the French Minister of Finance shared that the attackers used prepaid bank cards in advance of the attacks.
 - CNN reported that three safe houses used by the cell were rented for a year in advance with cash.
 - It has also been reported that Abaaoud's cousin Hasna Ait Boulachen helped affect a money transfer in her name before the St. Denis raids.
- Ultimately reporting suggests financing has been functioning through use of the Islamist networks in Europe.



Attacks: Documents and Travel Facilitation

- The Islamist networks appear to have been leveraged to facilitate forged document use and other forms of travel facilitation.

(One of the decedent Paris attackers was found with a forged Syrian passport)

- Car rentals and hotel accommodations were made in the names of various suspected personnel associated with the attacks.
- The attackers were also using public transportation potentially to achieve two ends.
 - to maintain anonymity and to blend into larger groups.
 - may possibly have factored into surveillance protocols.

(According to French police, Abaaoud was seen on the Paris metro the night of the attack.)

- Travel support from associates has featured prominently in all facets of the operation. - Samy Amimour and Abaaoud were thought to have been in Syria but made their way back to Europe through illicit channels.
- Many of the attackers are thought to be returning foreign fighters and evidence suggests at least one of the attackers travelled illicitly to Paris through Leros, Greece.



Procedural Measures

- **Operations Security**- encryption/dark net technology; community-based recruitment and coordination
- **Mass casualty targets**- Soft targets and opportunism
- **Primary targets and secondary attacks aimed at egress and/or responders** - targeting for maximum casualties and to extend terror impact by attacking recovery and mitigation capacity of targeted groups
- **Opportunity for symbolic targets** -national, international, ideological, or religiously significant targets contribute to the IS goals and narrative
- **Reliance on local network as opposed to reliance on Islamic State core**- leveraging regional resources and limiting communication and coordination with IS core improves operations security and improves the strategic goals of growth and more intimate regional inclusion.



Possible Objectives Unique to Paris Attacks

Delay of the third detonation at the stadium:

- At the stadium the first two explosions were just 4 minutes apart in the exterior of the facility and the final detonation was outside 33 minutes later.
- The plan may have been to cause panic with internal explosions and then target attendants as they evacuated the stadium.

Confrontation with law enforcement:

- Upon contact with law enforcement, the terrorists opted to detonate explosive belts rather than exchange gunfire with police. An aim to draw police into a lethal situation opposed to attempts to extend further attacks to the public at different venues is illustrated by the Bataclan team remaining in place from 2140 hours until 0020 hours.

Surviving terrorists/Follow-on objectives:

- Potentially some of the attackers were meant to survive by plan.
 - CNN reported the operational ringleader Abaaoud and Akroah were likely intending to conduct follow-on attacks on financial targets .
 - Salah Abdeslam's intentions are less clear, but timely and well-executed exfiltration suggests planning. Abdeslam's role in coordination, logistics, and network familiarity may have been considered valuable for continued operations.



Preparedness Considerations?

Perpetrators of CCTAs tend to research emergency management and law enforcement capabilities and response then design attacks to maximize harm, panic, and disruption to public safety systems.

Straining resources from first responders and degrading public confidence in safety and security resources amplifies impacts of CCTAs.

According to the IACP...

“Mass casualty and terrorist events are tragic and complex, putting strain on local resources and response capabilities at the exact time a coordinated, multijurisdictional response is required. Moreover, they can have lasting impact on the physical and mental health of responders and community members long after the event has occurred.”

SOURCE: [Mass Casualty Events and Terrorism | International Association of Chiefs of Police \(theiacp.org\)](https://www.theiacp.org/2017/05/16/mass-casualty-events-and-terrorism/)



What do we need to consider as a Preparedness Community?

Apply layered security concepts (physical, procedural, intelligence) to recognize and manage threats early. *f*

Expect a potentially significant delay in help arriving as first responders will be overwhelmed during a CCTA. *f*

Review existing plans to see if current actions may put people at increased risk for secondary attacks. *f*

Address how to implement support plans for survivors and families of the deceased. *f*

Ensure plans include how to provide mental health assistance and support in recovery support efforts. *f*



Resources

- [Planning Considerations: Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks \(fema.gov\)](#)
- [Complex Coordinated Attacks: Security Awareness for Soft Targets and Crowded Places \(cisa.gov\)](#)
- [Critical Decision Making for Complex Coordinated Attacks - Center for Domestic Preparedness \(dhs.gov\)](#)
- [Triage in Complex, Coordinated Terrorist Attacks - PubMed \(nih.gov\)](#)
- [JCAT Counterterrorism Guide For Public Safety Personnel \(dni.gov\)](#)
- [Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks: Paris Attacks of 2015 - Domestic Preparedness](#)



Questions

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